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CORPORATION LIENS ON STOCK.
T HE law of corporations is essentially a modern creation.
made necessary by modern business conditions. But the
courts, not legislative bodies, have been largely instrumental
in giving it its comprehensive scope arid symmetrical form. Per-
haps nowhere has the inherent power of the common law to develop
newt principles to meet changed conditions been more strikingly
shown than in this field.
The primary problems connected with the development of the
corporation relate to its organization and powers and the means
employed to enable it to perform its proper function as the chief
commercial and industrial agency of the times. The rights, duties,
powers and liabilities of the corporation, of its stockholders, and
of its officers and directors, and their legal relations respecting one
another and the parties with whom they deal in their corporate
and official capacity, are all essential features of corporation law,
and an understanding of tfiese subjects is necessary to an intelligent
appreciation of the nature of the corporation.
But every corporation organized with capital stock is not only a
corporation but a producer of instruments of credit. A certificate
of stock is evidence of the stockholder's interest in the company, but
it is also ani instrument which may be used-in commercial transac-
tions and in banking relations as a foundation for credit in innum-
erable ways. A corporation, like a bank, is in fact a creator of
credit through its issuance of securities. The money which the
stockholders invest in the property of the company comes back to
them in the form of these stock certificate credits. Indeed, the
corporation often issues more credit than it incorporates in its
physical properties, for earning power is frequently capitalized,
and it may thus become the basis for the issuance of additional
credit instruments. The common stock of the United States Steel
Corporation is largely of this sort, and the same is true of the com-
mon stocks of many other large corporations.
Thus, wholly apart from its character as an artificial person or
an industrial agency, the corporation has become immensely import-
ant in modern commercial life as a fiscal agency, or creator and
issuer of securities. Corporation stocks and bonds probably coristi-
tute the principal commercial securities of the. age. Of these it is
safe to say that stock issues much outweigh corporate bond issues
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in amount, and transactions in stocks are said to far exceed those in
bills and notes.'
It is therefore of the highest importance to the commercial and
financial world that dealings in corporate stocks should be made as
safe as possible, and that barriers and restrictions to their free trans-
fer should be as few and as slight as is consistent with their char-
acter. As universally used instruments of credit they should as
nearly as possible approximate the transferable quality of that other
great group of credit instruments, bills and notes.
It must be conceded that the courts have so far been unwilling
to declare corporate stock certificates fully negotiable, though they
have accorded them most of the qualities of such instruments. The
Supreme Court of the United States, in Bank v. Lanier,
2 said that
while neither in form nor character negotiable paper, "they approx-
imated it as nearly as practicable." In Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach
Co.,3 the Court of Appeals of New York said: "While such certifi-
cates do not possess all the qualities of commercial paper, they do
possess some or them, and innocent parties, dealing with them, will
be protected upon analogous principles." The extent of this protec-
tion is predicated upon an estoppel against the true owner to claim
adversely to one who purchases in good faith from a party lawfully
clothed with the indicia of title.4 This is a substantial protection, and
makes stock certificates practically negotiable as against claims of
prior holders, except in case of loss or theft.5
But there is another sort of claim beside that of the true owner,
which is often asserted against stock certificates, namely a claim of
lien on behalf of the corporation itself, for the unpaid portion of the
subscription price of the stock or for debts due to the corporation
from the past or present holder. The'recognized validity and com-
mon occurrence of such liens would make a striking distinctiorl
between stock certificates and negotiable instruments, and would in
fact materially diminish the commercial utility of such certificates
as instruments of credit. It is the purpose of this article to investi-
gate the methods by which such liens can be created and their valid-
ity as against the various parties who may be interested in the stock
represented by the certificates.
1 1 Dos Passos, Stock & Stock Brokers, p. 702.
2 1 Wall. (U. S.) 377.
3 148 N. Y. 659.
4 McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 325.
5 3East Birmingham Lafld Co. v. Dennis, 85 Ala. 565; Knox v. Eden Musee American
Co., 148 N. Y. 44z.
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At common law a corporation had no lien upon its stock for
assessments unpaid or for debts due it from its shareholders. 6
There are therefore but four possible methods by which liens could
be created in favor of the corporation upon the stock which it
issues, (i) by statute, (2) by charter, (3) by by-law, (4) by
contract.
LIENS CRrATJD BY STATUTZ.
There is a great variety in the statutes of the different states of
this country respecting their provision for liens in behalf of
corporations upon their stock. A summary of them all would
unduly extend the limits of this article. But the following details
of the general corporation acts, omitting all reference to specific
acts relating to particular classes of corporations, such as banks,
railroads, mining companies, etc., will illustrate their variety and
disclose their scope.
One class of statutes gives a lien to the corporation, upon stock
issued by it, for all debts due to it by a stockholder. In this group
belong Alabama,7 Arkansas, s Connecticut9 and Minnesota. 0
In New York the corporation has such a lien for all debts, in the
discretion of the directors, provided, the section of the statute cre-
ating it is written or printed on the face of the certificate."
Another group of statutes authorizes a forfeiture or sale of
stock, or prohibits transfer, or otherwise provides for a lien, in
case of unpaid and delinquent assessments. Such statutes are
found in Arizona,1 2 Delaware, 3 District of Columbia," Florida, 5
Idaho,'8  Kentucky, 7  Maryland,' 8  Massachusetts," °  Missouri, 20
Bank of Attica v. Manufacturers' & Traders' Bank, 20 N. Y. Sor, 507; Steamship
Dock Co. v. Heron's Adm'x, S2 Pa. St. 28o; Merchants' Bank v. Shouse, 102 Pa. St.
488, 492; Driscoll v. West Bradley & Cary Mfg. Co., 59 N. Y. 96, 102; Neale v. Janney,
2 Cranch C. C. 188, 17 Fed. Cas. No. zoo68.
7 Code, 1886, § x674.
8 Kirby's Digest, x904, § 853.
0 Conn. Gen. St., Revision of 1902, § 3332.
"Rev. St., 1905, § 2863.
"Consolidated Laws, 1909, Ch. 59, § 55.
22Act No. 38, Laws 1907.
"Rev. Code, as amended 1893, p. 577.
I'Code, § 613.
"Rev. St., 1892, § 2131.
18 Civil Code, § 2769, Amended by Session Laws 59o9, p. 163.
"'Ky. St., 1903, § 543.
s Pub. Gen. Laws, 1904, Art. 23, See. 7x.
0R. L., 59o2, Chap. ixo, § 41.
"OAnn. St., 19o6, § 965.
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Montana, 21 Nevada,2 2 New Hampshire,
2 3 New Mexico, 24 North
Carolina, 25 North Dakota,
20 Ohio,2 New Jersey,
28 New York,
29
Pennsylvania,"0  South Dakota,
31 Texas, 32 Utah,33 Vermont,
34 Vir-
ginia,35 Washington,
3" Wisconsin,3 7 and Wyoming.
38
Another group authorizes by-laws to be made which shall provide
for a lien through forfeiture and sale or restriction on transfer or
otherwise, for unpaid installments or assessments, and in this group
belong Colorado, 39 Indiana,40 Maine,
41 Maryland,4 2 Mississippi 3 and
Oregon.
4 4
Another group authorizes the corporation, by means of its by-
laws, to create a lien on stock for any debts due to the corporation
from the stockholder. Georgia4O 5 and South Carolina" have such
statutes.
In West Virginia4 T7 and Kansas 48 a lien for unpaid assessments
may be had in the discretion of the board of directors. In Okla-
homa4 9 forfeiture for non-payment of assessments may be provided
for by the terms of subscription. In Rhode Island5
0 the original
articles of incorporation may provide for a lien for unpaid assess-
ments or other indebtedness, enforceable as the by-laws may pre-
21 Rev. Codes, 1907, § 3877.
2 C. L., 1goo, § 875.
23 P. S., Chap. 149, § 17.
24 C. L., 1897, § 425.
25Revisal of z9o5, § 2170.
26Rev. Codes, x9o5, § 424S.
' Bates' St., x9o8, § 3253.
2s Gen. St., z895, Title Corporations, § 28.
2 Consolidqted Laws, 2909, Ch. 59, § 5o.
'o Purdon's Digest, 1903, P. 802, Title Corporations, § 93.
3 civil Code, 1903, § 460.
"Sayles' Tex. Civ. St., § 668.
mComp. Laws, 1907, § 333.
34 Pub. St., x9o6, § 4268.
25Code, 1904, § io5 e (28).
55Pierce's Code, 1905, § 7o64.
3St., 2898, § '754.
2 R. S., 1899, § 3038.
39 Mills' Ann. St., z892, § 480.
40 Burns' St., 29o8, § 4046.
41 R. S., 1903, Ch. 47, § 47.
42 Pub. Gen. Laws, 1904, Art. 23, § 63.
43 Code, 19o6, § 9o8.
"Bellinger & Coton's Codes, § SoS6.
45 Code, 1895, § 2825.
"Code, 1902, § 2848.
4T Code, 19o6, § 2251.
I "G. S., 1905, § 2366.
49 St., x9o3, § 956.
G. L., 1896, Title XIX, § 9!.
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scribe. In Iowa 5l the corporation.has a lien on its shares for taxes
paid thereon, the law requiring such taxes to be assessed against the
stockholders but to be paid by the company.
In California, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, Michigan and Ten-
nessee there seems to be no provision for such liens in the general
incorporation acts.
As to the validity of these statutory liens, there can be no ques-
tion. Such liens are valid against anyone, whether he be a taker
with or without actual notice, for the statute itself constitutes con-
structive notice to all who deal in the shares of corporations organ-
ized under its authority.
Thus, in Birmingham Trust and Savings Co. v. East Lake Land
Co., 5 2 it is said that when a lien is given to a corporation by statute,
"there is constructive notice to all persons dealing with the corpora-
tion, that they must, at their peril, without reference to what the
certificate recites, inform themselves as to any debts to the corpora-
tion that may affect the shares they propose to buy. If there is a
lien they are held to have known it, whether the certificate declares
it or not." The same rule was stated by the Supreme Court of
Michigan in Citizens' Bank v. Kalamazoo County Bank, 3 by the
Supreme Court of Arkansas in "Oliphint v. Bank of Commerce,"4 and
in Springfield Wagon Co. v. Bank of Batesville,55 by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin in H. W. Wright Lumber Co. v. Hixon,0 by
the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Platt v. Birmingham Axle
Co.5 7 and in First National Bank v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,5 1 by the
Supreme Court of Kansas in Battery v. Bank,'9 and by the Supreme
Court of the United States in National Bank v. Watsontown Bank.60
IENS CREATED BY CHARTER.
Morawetz, in his work on Corporations, says: "If the lien is pro-
vided for by the company's charter or articles of incorporation, or
by general law, all persons .purchasing shares are bound thereby,
and must, at their peril, inquire of the company's officers whether
the holders of the shares are indebted to it or not."'61 Clark &
Code, 1897, § 1325.
1o Ala. 304, 309.




7 41 Conn. 255.
W 45 Conn. 22.
'962 Kan. 384.
to 105 U. S. 217.
e Morawetz on Corporations, § 2o3.
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Marshall say on this question: "A lien may also be given by a pro-
vision in the articles of association, if such provision is not contrary
to the charter or general law."6 2 And Cook says: "Such a lien as
thi s in favor of the corporation may be created by statute or by
charter."6
The cases cited in support of these statements do not sustain them
in the broad form in which they are made, and they do not appear
to correctly state the law without certain qualifications.
The charter of a corporation may be granted by special act of the
legislature or it may be provided for and authorized under a general
incorporation act. Formerly the first method was common; in more
recent times incorporation under general statutes has become almost
universal.
Where the charter is the special act of the legislature, a lien
clearly authorized therein obviously stands upon essentially the same
footing as a strict statutory lien. The same rules apply in determin-
ing its force and effect as apply to statutory liens, and accordingly
all takers of stock affected by such a charter lien take with con-
structive notice thereof, -and their titles are subject to the prior
claim of the corporation, whenever facts exist making the lien
provision applicable. Farmers' Bank of Maryland v. Iglehart,
64
Cross v. Phoenix Bank, 5 Brent v. Bank of Washington,
8 Reese &
Fisher v. Bank of Commerce, 7 Stebbins v. Phoenix Fire Ins. Co.,""
Hodges v. Planters' Bank,69 Bank of Utica v. Smalley,
7 0 Union Bank
v. Laird7 1 Bohmer & Osterloh v. City Bank
7 2 Mechanics' Bank v.
Merchants' Bank,7
3 German National Bank v. Kentucky Trust Co.,
74
Kenton Ins. Co. v. Bowman. 5 In all these cases the charter ex-
pressly and unequivocally provided for a lien.
When the charter consists of a general act under which articles
of incorporation are executed and filed, the validity of the lien, as
against the world, depends upon the terms of the general act. That
is to say, unless the legislature has authorized it, the incorporators
23. Clark & Marshall on Corporations, § 575.
2 Cook on Corporations, § 522.
"6 Gill (Md.) So.
"x R. I. 39.
"so Pet. (U. S.) s96.
6 14 Md. 27x.
683 Paige (N. Y.) 350.
607 Gill & J. (Md.) 3o6.
2  Cow. (N. Y.) 770.
712 Wheat. (U. S.) 390.
77 Va. 445.
"345 Mo. 513.
' ig Ky. L. Rep. 361.
"' 84 K y. 436.
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cannot, by means of the articles of incorporation, create a lien which
will be effectual against all parties. It is immaterial whether the
legislature declares directly that a lien shall exist, or declares that
the articles of incorporation may create it. In either case it is the
act of the legislature which ordains the lien. So that, in seeking
to determine whether, in a given case, a lien exists, the act of the
legislature must be examined, and not merely the provisions of the
articles of incorporation. The questiori of the validity of the lien
under charters of this kind is therefore essentially the same question
as that arising under special legislative charters.
Thus, in New Orleans National Banking Ass'n v. Wiltz,76 where
an insurance company asserted a lien upon certain shares of its own
stock, the Circuit Court of the United States said: "The insurance
company was formed under the general incorporation law of the
state by public act passed. * * * It has no legislative charter.
This charter could not create any privilege unknown to the law of
the state, unless the power were expressly given in the general law."
And in Driscoll v. West Bradley & Cary Mfg. Co.,7 7 the Court of
Appeals of New York said that in order to sustain the validity of a
lien, the corporati6n "must point out the authority either in its
articles of association, and show that they are authorized by law,
or in some statute."
A very thorough discussion of this principle is found in a recent
decision of the Appellate Division of New York. Lyman v. Stae
Bank of Randolph.78 In that case article nine of the articles of
association of the bank provided that no shareholder who had failed
to respond to any call for an installment of capital or any interest
upon such. installment, or who was indebted to the bank either as
drawer or indorser, or as surety for any payments due the bank,
should be permitted to transfer his shares without the consent of a
majority of the board of directors. The general act under'which
the bank was established was. silent upon the subject of a lien. One
Adams was a stockholder and officer of the bank, and was indebted
to the bank in a large sum. The plaintiff's wife became a purchaser,
in good faith and for value, of thirty shares of Adams' stock, with-
out any actual knowledge of the existence of this provision of the
articles of association or of any existing lien or equity in favor of
the bank, and plaintiff took this stock from her as collateral for a
loan under the same conditions. The plaintiff presented his certifi-
cate representing this stock to the bank for transfer to his own
78 lo Fed. 330.
1 59 N. Y. 96.
73 8x N. Y. App. Div. 367.
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name, but the bank refused to transfer it until Adams' indebtedness
to it was paid, claiming a lien on the stock by virtue of its articles
of association.
The claim of the bank was that "the stock, having become im-
pressed with the indebtedness due from Adams to the bank, retained
that characteristic even in the hands of an innocent transferee," and
that Mrs. Lyman "was bound to know of the existence of article 9
and of its inhibitory provision." But the court said: "Precisely
how such information can be said to have been brought to her
notice does not fully appear. It certainly could not have been gained
from the certificate itself, for it contained no reference to the. bank's
articles of association, nor was there anything upon its face to indi-
cate that the right to sell or assign the same was subject to any
restriction or limitation whatever. On the contrary, it apparently
conferred upon the holder an unconditional power of disposition,
and in this respect was quite different from the certificate in Gibbs
v.- Long Island Bank,7 9 which bore upon its face the statement that
it was 'subject to the conditions and stipulations contained in the
articles of association above mentioned.' We conclude, therefore,
that in view of the elements of negotiability which the stock pos-
sessed, the omission upon the part of the bank to express, in some
manner, its contingent right to or interest therein was virtually an
assurance to a purchaser that the owner had full power and an unre-
stricted right to dispose of the same, and if such be the case, it
would seem to follow that, aside from any question of negotiability,
the bank under the undisputed facts contained in the record before
us, is now pstopped from asserting its claim as against title of the
plaintiff. This view is in harmony with well settled principles and
is supported by abundant authority." Upon appeal to the New
York Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed.
80
It would thus appear that the familiar statements found in the
text books, such as those above quoted, to the effect that a lien
created by charter is valid against everyone, must be restricted by
the qualification that in case the charter consists of a general statute
together with articles of association executed in pursuance thereof,
the authority for the lien must be found in that part of the charter
which comes directly from the legislature. The legislature may
authorize the articles of association to be so drawn that they shall in
terms provide for a lien, as in the Rhode Island statute above cited,
and in such a case the provisions for the lien would be found in the
0'83 Hun, 92; aff'd, 1Si N. Y. 657.
s oynan v. Bank of Randolph, 179 N. Y. 577.
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non-legislative portion of the charter, but such provisions would
seem to derive all their coercive force and effect from the legislativet
act pursuant to which the articles were drawn.
A single case has been found which holds that the articles of in-
corporation may, in the absence of any authorization from the legis-
lature, create a valid lien for debts due to the corporation, against '-
bona fide purchaser for value and without notice. This is Dempste2"
Mfg. Co. v. Downs.," The court says: "Such a lien is not prohib-
ited, and may be created by the articles of incorporation." In sup-
port of this statement the court cites four cases. The first is Brad-
ford Banking Co. v. Briggs & Co.,8"- where it was held that the
articles of association might create a lien valid only against takers
of stock with actual notice of the articles. The second is Sabin v.
Bank of Woodstock,"8 where a special legislative charter expressly
authorized the lien. The third is Bohmer v. City Bank of Rich-
mond,"' where a special legislative charter expressly authorized the
lien. The fourth is Leggett v .Bank of Sing Sing,85 where it was
held that one who purchased stock with knowledge that the articles
of association provided for a lien in favor of the corporation, took:
subject to such lien. It thus appears that none of the cases cited
by the court sustain its decision. Seemingly the court attached too
much weight to the general statements of the text-books, several of
which it cites.
LIZNS CRATED BY BY-LAW.
The leading case of Child v. Hudson's Bay Co."' held that a by-
law purporting to create a lien upon stock of a corporation for debts
due to it from the stockholders, is effectual for that purpose, though
neither charter nor statute authorize such a lien. However, in this
case the lien was asserted against the assignee in bankruptcy of a
stockholder who himself owed a debt to the company, so that the
case is authority only for the rule that a by-law lien, unauthorized
by law, is nevertheless valid"against one who is not a bona fide-
purchaser for value and without notice.
Does the law go farther than this, and permit a corporation to,
-establish a by-law lien which shall be good against the world, unless
such lien is authorized by statute? There would seem to be less.
reason for recognizing the binding force of a by-law lien than of a
1 126 Iowa, 80.
s231 Ch. Div. 29.
U 2 Vt. 353.
"77 Va. 445.
24 N. Y. 283.
2 Pere WMs. 207.
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charter lien, where no direct authority for it can be traced to the act
of the legislature, for the reason that articles of association are al-
most invariably filed with public officers and are open to public
inspection.
It is clear that a by-law can have no force which seeks to create a
lien in the face of a statutory prohibition. This has several times
been held, both by the federal and by the state courts, in cases
involving the powers of national banks. The National Bank Act
of 1863 provided for a lien upon stock to secure debts due from the
stockholders to the bank. The Act of 1864 was enacted as a substi-
tute for the earlier act, and omitted this section respecting liens.
The Act of 1864 also prohibited national banks from making loans
or discounts on the security of their own shares. These features of
the Act of 1864 have been held to disclose a policy on the part of
Congress to restrain national banks from acquiring liens on their
own stock, and in view of such policy, a by-law of a national bank
providing for such a lien is ineffectual for that purpose. Bullard v.
Bank, 7 Bank v. Lanier,8 Conklin v. Second National Bank, 9 Hagar
v. Union National Bank,90 Second National Bank v. National State
Bank,9' Lee v. Citizens' National Bank, 2 Evansville National Bank
v. Metropolitan National Bank,93 Rosenbach v. Salt Springs Na-
tional Bank,9 4 and Buffalo German Ins. Co. v. Third National
Bank."5 And a state statute copied from the National Bank Act of
1864 has been held to carry with it the construction previously given
to that act, so that no lien could be acquired by virtue of a by-law.
Nicollet National Bank v. City Bank.""
But a different question arises where the corporation seeks to
create a by-law lien, if the legislature has declared no law or policy
on the subject.
The leading case in this country on this question is Driscoll v.
West Bradley & Cary Mfg. Co.9 7 decided by the Court of Appeals
of New York. In this case the defendant corporation had made a
by-law providing that it should have a lien on its stock to secure
any indebtedness due to it from its stockholders. One Bradley was
s1 18 Wall. (U. S.) 589.
'I Wall. (U. S.) 369.
89 45 N. Y. 655.
1163 Me. 5og.
91 zo Bush (Ky.) 367.
9'2 Cin. Sup. Ct., 298.
3 Biss. 527; 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4573.
0 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 495.
w162 N. Y. 163.
" 38 Minn. 85.
9759 N. Y. 96.
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a stockholder and was indebted to the company. He assigned and
transferred his stock to a third person, from whom the plaintiff
purchased it in good faith and for value, and without any actual
knowledge of the existence of the by-law. The court said that if the
defendant had any power to set up this lien, it must be found only
in some statutory authority to pass the by-law. "The by-law of
the defendant is sufficient in terms, but it is not sufficient in law
unless it is warranted by some statute. * * * Therefore, we
may treat the by-law, for the purposes of this case, as creating a lien
upon the stock in favor of the defendant, if it had legal authority to
enact a by-law to that effect. It can find warrant from statute
law nowhere unless in the Revised Statutes, or in the general statutes
for the incorporation of manufacturing companies." The court then
proceeds to examine those statutes, and finds no provision authoriz-
ing such a by-law. It therefore concludes, that "Bradley and his
fellow directors or trustees, had no power to make any by-law,
binding on others than themselves, as actual or intended stockhold-
ers, which was not authorized by the Revised Statutes or by the
general manufacturing acts. It might be good as a contract between
themselves, but not as a by-law to affect strangers, or those not
consenting."
The same doctrine was well stated in Carroll v. Savings B'ank,98
where the court said: "At'common law, and independently of
positive provisions of the legislature granting or authorizing the
exercise of the power, a corporation cannot prohibit the transfer
of its shares on account of the indebtedness of the shareholder to
the corporation. When the stock is personal property, restrictions
upon its transfer must have their source in legislative action, and
the corporation itself cannot create these impediments." This state-
ment was subsequently quoted with approval by the Supreme Court
of Missouri in Bank of Atchison County v. Durfee.90 To the same
effect are Steamship Dock Co..v.Heron's Adinr, 10 Kinnan v. Sulivan
County Club,'0' Merchants' Bank of Easton v. Shouse,0 2 Bank of
Attica v. Manufacturers' and Traders' Bank,:0 3 Anglo-Californian
Bank v. Grangers' Bank,10 4 Bank of Colloden v. Bank of Forsyth
(under a statute authorizing a lien to be created by by-law, but
providing further that such lien should be valid against all takers
"IS Mo. App. 249.
11x8 MO. 444.
5® S2 Pa. St., 280.
30126 N. Y. App. Div. 213.




with notice),'10 Grafflin Co. v. Woodside,10 Bank of Holly Springs
v. Pinson.1° 7
The nisi prius case of McDowell v. Bank of Brandywine,0 8 de-
cided in a superior court in Delaware, in a very brief opinion, seems
to imply that a by-law lien is valid without statutory authority, if
the articles of association provide for it, and a very old case in
Alabama, Cunningham v. Alabama Life Ins. Co., 0 9 appears to go
almost as far, though the court did not rest the case wholly upon that
proposition, but made an examination of the statute and found gen-
eral language which might have authorized the lien. Aside from
these two cases, there seems to be no dissent from the rule stated
above.
The same rule, that statutory authority for a by-law lien is neces-
sary to give it validity against innocent purchasers of the stock, is
recognized in another class of cases which will now be examined.
In each of them it was assumed that the lien must derive its vital
force from the statute, and the question in each case was whether
the language of the statute did in fact authorize it.
In Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank,"0 the statute gave the
directors of the bank authority to make by-laws "for the manage-
ment of its property, the regulation of its affairs and the transfer
of its stock." This was held to authorize a by-law which the direct-
ors adopted, providing for a lien on the stock of the bank for any
indebtedness due to it from the stockholders. In Lockwood v.
Mechanics' Bank,""' statutory language identical with that just
quoted was likewise held sufficient to authorize such a lien. In
St. Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. Goodfellow," 2 a provision in a
special charter declared that the stock of the company should be
deemed personal property, and should be assignable and transferable
according to such rules and restrictions as the board of directors
should make and establish, and this was held sufficient to authorize
a by-law lien for debts due to the company. In Pendergast v. Bank
of Stockton," 3 a statute authorizing a corporation "to make by-laws
for the management of its property, the regulation of its affairs
and the transfer of its stock," and declaring that "the stock of the
103 12o Ga. 575.
"' 87 Md. 146.
20 S8 Miss. 421.
106 1 Harr. (Del.) 27.
20o 4 Ala. 652.
'0'45 o. 513.
19 R. I. 308.
12 9 MO. 149.
1U12 Sawy. io8; 09 Fed. Cas. No. 00908.
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company shall be transferable in such manner as shall be prescribed
by the by-laws of the company," was held to authorize a by-law lien,
though the holding was perhaps obiter, since the plaintiff took the
stock with actual notice of the by-law.
But it is very doubtful if any of the foregoing cases are entitled
to much weight. In view of the immense importance attaching to
the free commercial transfer of stock certificates, clearer language
than that relied upon in those cases ought to be employed, if pur-
chasers are to be put upon inquiry in taking stock certificates in due
course of business, and the overwhelming weight of authority so
declares.
As for the cases cited above, the two Missouri cases have been
practically overruled by Bank of Atchison County v. Durfee,114
where the court held that a statute providing that the stock of the
company should be deemed personal estate and should be trans-
ferable in the manner prescribed by the by-laws, and that the com-
pany might make by-laws for the regulation of its affairs and for
the transfer of its stock, did not authorize a by-law attempting to
create a lien in the company's favor for debts due to it. The Rhode
Island case was decided in 1869; it involved the construction of the
National Bank Act of 1864, and held that a by-law lien was author-
ized by that act; but the Supreme Court of the United States, in
the following year, passed upon the same question and came to a
directly opposite conclusion, in Bank v. Lanier."5 The Pendergast
case is likewise of little value by reason of the contrary holding by
the United States Supreme Court.
The rule seems now to be clearly established that general lan-
guage, of the kind above shown, is not sufficient -to authorize a by-
law lien. Thus, in Bullard v. Bank,116 it was held by the United
States Supreme Court that a statutory provision authorizing a bank
to make by-laws for the regulation of its business and the conduct of
its affairs, and providing further that the stock should be transfer-
able on the books of the corporation in.such manner as might be
prescribed in the by-laws or articles of association, did not authorize
a by-law lien on the stock- of the bank in its own favor. In Bank of
Holly Springs v. Pinson,11 7 it was held that a by-law lien was not
authorized by a charter and corporation act empowering the com-
pany to make by-laws to regulate the management of its business
and the mode and manner of transferring its stock. In Grafflin Co.
2"4118 MO. 431.
225 'xx Wai. (U. S.) 369.
2s x8 Wall. (U. S.) 589.
117 58 Miss. 421.
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v. Woodside,:"" authority for the company to make by-laws for the
management of its property and the transfer of its stock, did not
give the company a right to create a by-law lien good against a
bona fide purchaser. In Anglo-Californian Bank v. Grangers'
Bank, " it was held that the power of a corporation to make by-laws
for the transfer of its stock, did not include the power to create
liens thereon, affecting purchasers for value without notice. In
Driscoll v. West Bradley & Cary Mfg. Co.1 20 general power to make
by-laws for the management of property, regulation of affairs and
transfer of stock, was held not to authorize the creation of a by-law
lien. In Kinnan v. Sullivan County Club,1 21 statutory authority to
make by-laws for the regulation of the company's affairs and the
transfer of its stock, was held not to authorize a by-law lien. And in
Bryon-v. Carter,1 22 it was held that statutory authority to direct the
manner of transfer of stock, does not empower the company to pro-
hibit the transfer so long as the owner owes it a debt.
The foregoing review of the cases seems to establish the rule that
a mere by-law lien in favor of a corporation can never be legally
asserted unless power to enact the by-law has been given to the
corporation by the legislature; and further, that general statutory
language authorizing the company to make by-laws regulating its
business or property or the mode of transferring its stock, does not
confer upon the company the power to make a by-law creating a
lien in its own behalf for claims against its stockholders.
LIENS CREATED BY cONTRACT.
The lawhas never prohibited parties from creating liens upon
property by agreement, which shall be valid against all who are
parties to the agreement or take the property with actual notice of
it. And under this general principle it has often been held that liens
may exist in favor of corporations upon their stock by reason of
agreement to that effect entered into between the corporation and its
stockholders. Such agreements may be express or implied, and are
subject largely to the same rules as apply to ordinary contracts.
The cases in which the question has arisen are mostly those in
which the contract is implied, and arises from a purchase of stock
with a knowledge of the claim which the corporation makes upon
it. Such claim may be asserted by an unauthorized provision in the
218 87 Md. 146.
63 Cal. 362.
59 N. Y. 96.
226 N. Y. App. Div. 213.
22 La. Ann. 98.
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articles of association or in the by-laws, or by a statement to that
effect in the certificate of stock, or by virtue of a usage.
If a lien is sought to be created in the articles of association, but is
invalid as against the world because the statute does not authorize
it, it may nevertheless be valid against anyone who takes the -stock
with knowledge of the provision for a lien, on the ground that by
his own act he voluntarily consents to hold title subject to the lien.
Leggett v. Bank of Sing Sing,1 23 Bradford Banking Co. v. Briggs
& Co. 2' And, generally, one who is not a bona fide purchaser for
value takes subject to equities against his assignor, so that if his
assignor held subject to such a lien by implied contract, the assignee
takes a title equally subjecd to it. The case of Mohawk National
Bank v. Schenectady Bank,12 can be reconciled with other New
York cases on this ground.
Similarly, if a by-law is made which in terms provides for a lien
in favor of the corporation upon its own shares, but no statutory
authority warrants such a lien, it may nevertheless be held good
against all takers with notice, or against those who, not being
innocent purchasers for value, are limited to a subordinate title held
by their assignors, on the theory that while it is invalid as a by-law,
it is good as a contract. Cases which are frequently cited as author-
ity for the general validity of a by-law lien, such as Child v. Hud-
son's Bay Co., referred to supra, are cases of this kind, and are only
authority for the proposition that a by-law lien is good against those
who consent to be "bound by it and others standing in their shoes.
The same may be said of Farmers' 6- Traders' Bank v. Haney, 125
Planters' & Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Selma Bank, 1 7 In re
Bachman,28 Costello v. Portsmouth Brewing Co.0 2 9 Des Moines
National Bank v. Warren County Bank,30 Peoples' Home Bank v.
Sadley,131 Bank of Culloden v. Bank of Forsyth,'2 Tuttle v. Wal-
ton,133 and Young v. Vough. 3
A contract lien in favor of a corporation may also be asserted by
a statement to that effect on the face of the certificate. Thus, in
M 24 N. Y. 283.
22431 Ch. Div. i9.
78 Hun, (N. Y.) go.
m87 Iowa, 101.
2 63 Ala. 585.
a2 Fed. Cas. -No. 707.
"'69 N. H. 405.
'"§7 Iowa, 204.
'"z Cal. App. i8g.
13212o Ga. 575.
2,3 x Ga. 43.
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Jennings v. Bank of California,'5 a provision was inserted in a cer-
tificate of stock that no transfer would be made upon the books
until after the payment of all indebtedness due to the corporatiofil
from the record holder of the stock. There was no statute or
charter provision or by-law or usage to sanction the claim of lien,
but the court held that by accepting the certificate the purchaser
assented to a contract lien upon his stock. So, in Vansands v. Mid-
dlesex County Bank,1 36 the certificate in controversy contained this
provision on its face, "transferable at said bank only by him or his
attorney, on surrender of this certificate, subject nevertheless to his
indebtedness and liability at the bank, according to the charter and
by-laws of said bank." Nothing in the charter or by-laws purported
to give the bank a lien, but it was held that the statement in the
certificate was binding on the purchaser, since his acceptance of it
was tantamount to an agreement between him and the bank that his
stock should be subject to a lien to secure his indebtedness to
the bank.
And finally, a contract lien may arise from usage, of which the
taker has notice and to which he gives his express or implied
approval. In Waln v. Bank of North Ainerica,13T there was no
charter or by-law or written regulation of the board of directors,
giving the bank a lien on its stock for debts due from its stockhold-
ers, but it was shown that there was a usage to that effect, which was
known to the purchaser. The court said: "A course of dealing-
a usage, an understanding, a contract, express or implied,-is the
lien of the parties and a law to them. * * * The understood
notice to Mr. Wain, his continuing to deal with the bank, with full
knowledge of this term and condition, is equally binding on him and
the present plaintiffs as if it were a written regulation, a by-law, a
provision in the charter, or clause inserted in the very certificate
of stock."
CONCLUSIONS.
The result of the foregoing study of the law relating to the crea-
tion and effect of liens in favor of corporations upon their-own
stock, seems to be, that such liens, in the absence of an agreement
to which the holder is held to have assented, are not valid unless
authorized by the legislature either through a special charter or a
general act; that liens sought to be created by articles of association
or by by-laws are equally ineffectual unless authority to create them
'" 79 Cal. 323.
2W 26 Conn. 143.
137 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 89.
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can be traced to legislative action; and that in view of the great im-
portance of certificates of stock in commercial transactions, and the
vital necessity of preserving their commercial qualities, authority
to create a lien cannot be derived from vague and general terms, but
express and explicit language clearly empowering the corporation to
assert such a lien must be found in the statute, if the claim of the
corporation is to prevail against a bona /de purchaser for value and
without notice.
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